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I

IN TR O D U C TIO N

A study of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) between 1930 and
1953 reveals the directive force of Walter White.

His

own personality, moderation, use of political pressure
and personal contact with government officials became
synonymous with the NAACP itself.

White, a moderate

who avoided direct confrontation with the government
over specific issues, was nevertheless unrelenting in
his quest for Black equality.

Because of his position in

the organization White is an effective vehicle to examine
the issues faced by the NAACP in this period.
White’s first exercise in national leadership
occurred in the Scottsboro case in 1931*

In this case,

which achieved international notoriety, nine Black
youths were sentenced to die for the alleged rape of
two disreputable white girls.

The Communist Party of

the United States (CPUS) seized the initative with a
program of pressure and agitation which they hoped
would win the "boys" release and make the CPUS attractive
to Blacks.

White led the NAACP's resistance to what

he considered a Communist encroachment on Black America.
White and the NAACP had long worked within the American
system, and they felt that any external attack on it
would destroy Black America as well.

Finally, there

was the challenge to the NAACP*s traditional leadership.
This case thus became of greater significance than the
1
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fight to save the lives of nine falsely accused young
men.
In the 1930's White also led the MAACP's fight
to make lynching a Federal offense.

By using the threat

of a Black bloc vote in the large Northern cities White
exerted enough political pressure to keep an anti-lynching
bill, before Congress during the 1930's.

Unfortunately,

White was only strong enough to get these bills up for
consideration; he was not stronger than Southern in
fluence in the Congress and the NAACP, liberal Congressmen
and Blacks had to settle for the attempt rather than
the realization.

This type of simulated action rather

than implemented reforms will serve as a focal point
for attacks on the NAACP by challenging Blacks in the
post World War Two era.
In the early 19^0's White and the NAACP turned
their attention to the war.

While giving general support

to the defense effort, White called for Black participation
on a full and equal basis.

Historically, the armed

forces had been as rigorous about segregation as the
Southern states.

He hoped that through full and equal

participation in the war white Americans would recognize
Blacks

as full and equal citizens.

Once again White did

not call for militant confrontation, but expressed
himself through various articles in popular magazines
and a critical monograph.
White's background gives some clues to his moderation.
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Under Georgia law, White and his family were Black,
but not from outward appearances.

White had blond hair,

blue eyes and skin as fair as any white person.
his family's appearance mattered little.

But

They were

legally Black, and this alone made them despised by
whites.

A race riot in Atlanta in 1906 left a lasting

impression on White, as it defined his place in American
society:
I was a Negro, though as light as any white
a human being with an invisible pigmentation
which marked me a person to be hunted, hanged,
abused, discriminated against, kept in poverty
and ignorance, in order that those whose skin
was white would have readily at hand a proof
of their superiority, a proof patent and inclusive,
accesible to the moron and the idot as well as
the wise and the genius.1
White worked his way through Atlanta University
where the predominatly Northern white faculty tempered
his anger with Christian pronouncements.

The faculty

was dedicated to turning out Blacks who were of the
highest moral and religious character, and White early
recognized the need for the support and recognition of
white America.
Upon graduation White served for a short time in
an Atlanta Black insurance company, but he did not lose
his desire for an active role in the fight for Black
equality.

In 1918 he became an Assistant Secretary of

1Walter White, A Maxi Called White, (New York;
Viking Press, 19^8) p. 11.
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the NAACP with a salary of #1,200 a year, and stepped
to the firing line in the battle against lawlessness
and racial discrimination.
In the next five years White continually put his
life in danger through personal investigations of
lynchings and other injustices, his physical appearance
making these personal investigations possible.

He

exposed his findings in such liberal magazines as the
Nation, New Republic, and Harper*s.
tale.

His was a grisly

Nineteenth century lynchings had been simple

affairs with the Black being hanged or shot by a small
group of whites revenging some alleged crime.

By 1915.

whites often had turned revenge into community picnics.
They traveled hundreds of miles to witness a lynching.
They even came to see the Black roasted to death over an
open fire, to see him tortured and to take away part
of his remains as souvenirs.

Lynching was a way to

keep the Black man in his "place."
The lynchings moved North after the First World
War, becoming race riots.

These riots coincided with

a "red scare" sweeping America.

Southerners told

America that any move toward racial equality was a
move toward Socialism and thus toward Communism.

White

and the NAACP were faced with the challenge of dis
associating themselves from Communist tactics and
Ideology and working within the American system for
Black equality.
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In recent years the NAACP has been much maligned
by Increasingly impatient voices.

Yet the fight put up

by Walter White and the NAACP was a good one and their
failures were not so much personal as they were the
failures of American society in general.

A study of

three of the more important crisis faced by Walter White
and the NAACP In the thirties and forties depicts the
battle fought by a man and an organization which always
tried to bring about reform "within the accepted channels.
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II.

TEE SCOTTSBORO CASE

In 1931» Walter White and the NAACP faced a
challenge for the leadership of Black America.

This

challenge came not from within the NAACP or even the
majority of the Black population, but from the Soviet
directed Communist Party of the United States (CPUS).
The Communist Party hoped to use the Scottsboro case
to rally Black people to the cause of Communism.

Nine

young Black men were tried in Scottsboro, Alabama, for
the alleged rape of two white women of doubtful character.
Local Blacks put up the initial effort to free the
youths but were defeated by the power of Southern mob
rule, and a lack of money.
youths to death.

This defeat condemned the

Walter White felt the NAACP could

overturn the convictions in the Alabama or Federal
Supreme Court.

He based the appeal on the hostile

atmosphere present during the trial.
Other groups wanted to free the youths for their
own reasons.

In the initial trial the International

Labor Defense (ILD) sent a letter to presiding Judge
A* J. Hawkins stating that he "would be held personally
responsible unless the nine defendants were immediately
released."^

White knew that the ILD's threats and mass

^■Walter White, "The Negro and the Communists,**
Harper*s. December 1931. P»

6
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action would only make things worse— Southerners hate
to be told how to deal with their "Negro problem."
White also felt that the ILD was more interested in
the propaganda value of a losing case than in seeing
justice.1

But no matter what the ILD did the Scottsboro

case was tailor-made for Communist propaganda.

Blacks

would again be shown as losers in the capitalistic
system.

A 1928 conference in Chicago of the League

of Struggle for Negro Eights— the Black wing of the
CPUS— had debated the American Black problem and
2
concluded that the time was right for action.
In
October of 1928, Moscow issued a lengthy resolution on
how the Communists could capitalize on the oppression
of the Black American.

Black workers were urged to

"form organizations which ’if properly organized and
well led' could 'play a considerable role in the class
struggle against American imperialism' and in leading
'the movement of the oppressed masses of the Negro
populace."-'

Thus the home party organization charged

the CPUS with the responsibility of recruiting Black
Americans to Communism.
The CPUS felt that they could easily break down
Black America's loyalty to the United States.

The

^White, A Man Called White, p. 131*
2White, "The Negro and the Communists," p. 6 6 .
^ibid.
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ground work had been lain by "loyal Americans" whose
bigotry and prejudice had given Blacks the status of*
being men in body only.
the Communists.

The depression also helped

Blacks had been destroyed economically,

with all hopes dashed for the present and the future.
This lack of a future was especially exploited by
Communists in an effort to convert Blacks to their
cause.

Communists urged Blacks to throw off capitalism

and Join the proletariat revolution toward a classless
society.
To achieve leadership in Black America the
Communists had to destroy Blacks* faith in the NAACP,
the only influential and sensitive organization Blacks
had in America.

The Communist plan was simple.

The

Scottsboro case propaganda would be used to discredit
the NAACP.

The NAACP would be shown as cold-hearted

and inept in its vain attempts to achieve equal Justice
for Blacks.

It would also be shown as a tool of the

capitalists.1

The case against the NAACP was made easy

when White and the NAACP were tardy in entering the
2
Scottsboro case after the ILD.
Communist propaganda
began to tell how the NAACP jumped on the band wagon
with feeble attempts to free the "boys,'* only after the

1White, "The Negro and the Communists," p. 6?.
^"The Communists and the Scottsboro Case," New
Republic. May 13. 1931, p. 3^3.
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ILD had already retained counsel for the boys.
Throughout the Initial trial the ILD contended that
only working class pressure could free the defendants.
White disapproved of mass pressure and preferred the
legal approach.

Thus the Communists and the NAACP

were at odds over the method to be used.
This strong anti-Communist stand was not immediately
accepted by all members of the NAACP.

William Pickens,

a NAACP Assistant Secretary, endorsed the ILD saying,
"The only ultimate salvation for black and white workers
was in their united defense, one of the other."1
Pickens, however, was soon pressured into accepting
2
the NAACP*s anti-Communist line.
White felt that
accepting Communist aid would be adding anti-red
feelings to existing anti-Black feelings.

The prosecution

in the Initial Scottsboro trial had exploited antiBlack feelings to the fullest.

The NAACP had to be

careful because the taint of Communism could destroy
everything it had worked for.
The CPUS reacted strongly to NAACP opposition.

They

called the leadership of the NAACP traitors to the cause
of equality for the Black American.

William Patterson,

Black National Secretary of the ILD, attacked the NAACP

1Edmund Wilson, "The Freight-Car Case," New Republic,
August 26, 1931. Pp. 1*1-42.
2ibid.
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leadership in general and Walter White in particulir,
and appealed to tne rank and file members to come over
to a joint defense effort:
Scottsboro and the program of the I.L.D.
are a call to struggle. The question of the
defense of the Scottsboro boys is a political
question. The denial of the Constitutional
rights raised as an issue of this trial is an
evidence of this. . .We call the membership of
the N.A.A.C.P. . . .to join and build the
Scottsboro Action Committees. . .Step over the
heads of your leadership which has linked itself
inseparably with the ruling class of America. 0 .
ONLY MASS PRESSURE WILL FREE THE SCOTTSBORO BwiS.
bold letters appear in the orlglonal
In a letter to the New Republic responding to an
editorial on Communists in the Scottsboro case, Herbert
Seligmann, Publicity Director of the NAACP, stated that
"The

N.A.A.C.P. could not in any way be associated

with Communists tactics or their defense of the boys.”
He further stated, "The N.A.A.C.P. feels that the
tactics of the Communists have already gravely inflamed
sentiment in Alabama and have intensified the difficulty
of saving the eight condemned boys."

He finished by

Insisting that the NAACP had the best defense council in
the country ready and available if the NAACP would be
2
given complete charge of the case.
The next issue of the New Republic carried a
response by Joseph Pass, Publicity Director of the ILD.

^William Patterson, "Scottsboro," Labor Defender.
August 1933* P* 22.
2Herbert Seligmann, "The Communists and the Scottsboro
Case," New Republic, May 27, 1931* P- ^ 7•
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Ha concentrated on the publicity aspect of the Scottsboro
case.

He quoted Black newspapers that were disillusioned

over the NAACP’s role in the Scottsboro case, and their
condemnation of NAACP inaction.1
however,

These Black newspapers,

backed the Communists only because they felt the

NAACP had not done enough; they did not accept the full
2
Communist party line.
It appeared Communism had the proper time and
conditions to take over the leadership of Black America.
But the Communists failed.

Why?

In an article in Harper’s ,

White examined the Communist failure:
That the opportunity to take lasting
advantage of this (the Scottsboro easel was
lost is almost entirely due to the short
sightedness of the leaders of the Communist
party in the United States. Had they been
more Intelligent, honest, and truthful there
is no way of estimating how deeply they might -—
have penetrated into Negro life and consciousness.3
White was referring to the CPUS pratice of branding
anyone who did not follow the Communist party line as
a traitor and a tool of the capitalists.

It was evident

to White that the Communists were only out to gain
propaganda from the case.

White knew the Communists

call for mass worker pressure would not be effective
in the South--the only Southerners working for the

1Joseph Pass, "The Scottsboro Case and the Communists,’’
New Republic, June 3, 1931. P» 75»
2ibid.
^White, "The Negro and the Communists,'* p. ?1.
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“boys" freedom were prominent middle and upper-class
whites, while white Southern workers were working hardest
for the "boys” conviction.
White also felt that "Enemies of the Negro would
surely utilize Communist agitation as a pretext for refusal
to remedy bad conditions and for stifling legitimate protest
by Negroes through attributing It to 'Communist* propaganda.
Thus White felt that the Communists were only making things
worse for Blacks in the South.
To show further the ineptness of the ILD, White quoted
heavily from the Communist Party's Revolutionary Age:
Such is the poisonous blight spread in every
direction by the new sectarian policies dominating
the Communist Party today, that even this glorious
page taking up the defense of the Scottsboro "boys"
had been darkened by its ominous shadow. False
and suicidal tactics have well nigh undone the
achievements of profoundly correct principles! . .
Coupled with this. . .was an equally false
estimation of the role of petty bourgeois organ
izations among the Negroes as an oppressed people.
Nor was any sign exhibited of an appreciation
of the importance of gaining a labor base among
the white workers. . .Thus has the Communist
Party again gotten Itself into the unenviable
position that it has been in altogether too
frequently in recent months— that of a force for
disunity and splitting.^
White cited the total swing away from the Communists,
even by Black intellectuals.

Paraphrasing Dr. W.E.B.

DuBois' September, 1931* Crisis article on the Scottsboro
casev White ws

3d of a white "backlash" in the South:

1lbld.
^White, "The Negro and the Communists," pp. 71-72.
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That If the Communists had been really intelligent
they would have Joined hands with any and all
oodles and individuals who honestly sought to
provide the best legal defense possible, and the
case won, they could have proceeded to point
out that legal defense alone, even if successful,
will never solve the larger Negro problem but
that further and more radical steps are needed.
. . .Unfortunately, American Communists* tactics
were neither wise nor intelligent. . .If the
Communists want these lads murdered, then their
tactics of threatening Judges and yelling for
mass action on the part of white Southern workers
is calculated to insure this.’
White then went on to defend the action of the NAACP
in the Scottsboro case:
Clarence Darrow’s entrance into the cases at
Scottsboro effectively silences in the minds
of all but the most intransigent the argument
that 'capatilists* are trying to murder the
nine Negro boys of the Scottsboro cases. In the
meantime the United States can, if it will,
learn a lesson from these cases, tragically so
typical of three centuries of oppression of the
Negro here. The Negro is not turni'g red Just
yet; but that circumstance is due chiefly to the
blunders of the Communists.2
White deduced that because the NAACP had hired the best
legal council in the country, they were the best bet to
free the "boys*' from the death sentence.

He also warned

the American people that they must stop prejudice and
injustice or there would be a Black-Red union in America.
After telling how the Blacks might turn to Communism,
White offered an alternative solution:
There is but one effective and intelligent
way in which to counteract Communist efforts

1lbld.
2 ibid.
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At proselyting among American Negroes, nnd
thnt method is dranti c revision of the nlmost
chronic American Indifference to the Metro’s
plight. Give him Jobs, decent living conditions,
and homes. Assure him of Justice In the courts
and protection of life and property in Mississippi
as well as in New York*
Put an end to flagrant
and unchecked disregard of the Negro's constitut
ional right to vote. . ,ln brief, the only
antidote to the spread among American Negroes of
revolutionary doctrines is even-handed Justice.1
To White it was the American system that was a b o u t to
drive the Black American into the arms of the Communists.
The only solution was for the United States and all of
its citizens to live up to the fundamental principles that
they had put forth in all of the articles of the Constitu
tion and the Bill of Rights.
Even if White had agreed with the Communists'
philosophy he could not have deserted his cause of eaual
Justice for the Black American.

To him Communism meant

that Blacks would have two strikes against them.

Blacks

were aliens in a white society, where skin color was more
Important that initatlve or intelligence.

Blacks would

also be reds, which would mean a double dose of hatred
2
from white Americans.
White still believed in America,
and anyone who was a member of the Communist party no
longer believed in America, because the Communists were
out to destroy the American system of government.
White used the Communists to help in his propaganda

1lbld.
2Ibid.
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for equal rights ana justice for Blacks.

He warned white

America that Blacks would no longer stand for unequal
treatment and that they would choose alternatives that
whites might find unacceptable.

The Communist theme of

racial and economic equality was a point that Black
Americans could see and feel.

Keports by the CPUS told

of the total equality of all people in the Soviet Union.
This was not a strong selling point for whites but for
Blacks who never had equality it was impressive.

White

pointed out that Black men could easily respond to the
call for class agitation.

They were the lower class of

American society and it would be easy for them to feel
close to the white worker who was a member of a party
that would free them from their new bondage.*
White told in plain language why Blacks would look
to Communism.

America's talk about freedom— while

practicing hate and injustice— was weak compared with the
O'

Soviet

boast of "equality" for the masses.’"

If White and the NAACP had Joined the CPUS the Black
American would have been destroyed.

Just being Black

put a person in the lowest American cast, and to also be red
would make him a man with no friends or future.

Every

Black would be identified as a red agent and subject to
the type of mass persecution that swept German Jews after

1White, "The Negro and the Communists." p. 70.
2ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

16
1932.

The only road for White to take was to work

within the system.

He knew the Communists were only out

to strengthen their position and not to help Blacks.
White and the NAACP have recently been attacked by
scholars who think that they were derelict in their
defense of the Scottsboro "boys."

One such scholar,

Hugh Murray Jr., felt the NAACP should have joined with the
ILD and made a Joint effort to free the "boys.**1. But
as previously explained, this would have been impossible
for the NAACP, which could not afford to be accused of
becoming a Communist-front organization.

Blacks would

nave been denied all rights and priviledges they had already
won on the pretext they were no longer citizens of the
United States and because they adhered to a doctrine
that was anti-American.

To remain independent, the NAACP

could not use the same arguments that the ILD had used to
challenge the convictions of the “boys,"
The ILD challenged the convictions on ‘‘
/hree grounds:
the mob atmosphere in the courtroom prevented a fair
trial; the local judge's appointment of an Incompetent
2
council; and the exclusion of Blacks from the jury.
The United States Supreme Court chose to exam ne only the
correctness of the defense procedures.

If the NAACP had

taken this line of argument they would have exposed their

^■Bernard Sternsher, The Negro In Depression and War.
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969) PP* 278-279.
2lbld.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

own Incompetence.

They had been saying that they were

the first on the case and that they backed Mr. Roddy the
first defense council to the hilt.

The ILD pressed its

point and won a new trial for the "boys.'1

Murray felt

the ILD was. the only group that could have won new trials
as the NAACP did not have the proper frame of mind to
challenge itself.1

The NAACP did not challenge itself,

but was able to leave this case to the ILD and still not
lose face in the Black community because Scottsboro was
only one of many efforts that the NAACP was making and
had made.
In his autobiography, White ga e the best possible
summary of the injustice done at Scottsboro:
In the intervening years it has become
increasingly clear that the tragedy of a
Scottsboro lies, not only in the bitterly cruel
injustice which it works upon its immediate
victims, but also, and perhaps even more, in
the cynical use of human misery by Communists
in propagandizing for Communism, and in the
complacency with which a democratic government
views the basic evils from which such a case
arises. A majority of Americans still Ignore,
2
. . .the plain implications in similar tragedies.
The Scottsboro case and other acts like it would
make a person who did not have a great love for the
United States

and what it stands for go over to the

Communists or to even leave the country as many American
Blacks did in the pre-World War Two era.

These men who

1lbld.
^White, A Man Called White, p. 133*

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

left were not the share-cropper farmers but the
Intellectuals who would have made many great contributions
to the thought and life of the American people; but they
left rather than have to submit to the humiliations and
prejudice that were practiced in America, both North and
South.

White had a great faith in the American system,

and he felt that if justice could be done the United States
would become the greatest country on earth.

This is the

only explanation for the man who made so many great efforts
to combat injustice by working within the system, even
though he knew that the cards were stacked against him,
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ill.

WALTER WHITE AND THE A N T I-L Y N C H

B IL L S

The fight against lynching started before the First
World War and continued well beyond the Second World War.
In the 1930‘s this movement gathered force among concerned
citizens, both Black and white.

A 1919 survey prepared

by the NAACP for Senate Investigators revealed fifty
lynchings during the first six months of that year, and
all but four of these were Black, ten of whom were burned
at the Stake.*

The Literary Digest expressed the concern

of white citizens in an article entitled, "Mob-rule
as a National Menace," which asked, "Must Americans
admit that they share with the Germans the cruel and
bloodthirsty qualities that go with the name 'Hun?"2
The war had brought out a humanitarian concern that
America's policies toward Black citizens would be
classified on the same level as the atrocities committed
by the Germans and their Turkish allies during the World
War.

Concern was so strong even Southern church women

denounced the evil of lynching.
done to destroy lynching?

Why was nothing ever

Simply stated people with the

power to correct social problems seldom do anything
until the problem hurts them, and lynching was a problem

1"Mob-rule as a National Menace," Literary Digest.
October 18, 1919, p. 9.
2lbld.
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Peculiar only to Black?*,
Southern senators and Hepresentatlves zealously
attacked the »*ntj~lyncn bills under consideration.

They

knew the true reasons for lynching were not the stated
cause of rape but rather race and economics.*

After the

great 1919 riot in Chicago, Walter White insisted that the
causes were first, race prejudice and second, economic
coapetltlon.2

The growing economic power of Blacks was

even being felt In the South.

When the great post-World

War One Black migration to the North was over, the
Southern planter found himself deprived of one of his
Greatest assets--cheap Black labor.

Now Blacks could

almost demand the wage that they expected to receive and
be assured of somewhere near that price.

Studies made

of the period 1890 to 19^0 comparing the number of
lynchings to the rise and fall of cotton prices and land
values showed that during periods of low cotton prices
Blacks were lyncned with greater frequency for some
suspected crime.3

Whites used lynching to keep Blacks

from receiving the benefits of American citizenship.
Southern Congressmen knew equality for Blacks would put
them out of office and Blacks were a majority in a number

^■Walter White, "Chicago and its Eight Seasons,"
Crisis. October, 1919, p. 299.
2ibid.
■^Allen D. Grimshaw, ed.t Racial Violence in the
United States. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing C o . , 19^9) p.
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of Southern districts.

No man, Black or whit^ wants an

unresponsive or irresponsible representative.
The position of Soutnern Congressmen was outlined
by Walter White in testimony before the Sub-Committee,
of the Senate Committee on the Judicary:
In many of the states, where most of the
lynchings take place, Negro citizens are
disfranchised in flagrant violation of the
Federal Constitution. As a result, the lawenforcement officials in those states, and
those charged with the duties of preventing
lynchings and seeing the law is upheld, feel
they have no responsibility to Negro citizens,
who are voteless in most of these states, and
prefer to yield to the pressure and to the threats
of the mobs themselves.
A decline in the number of lynchings during and
after the First World War led many people to believe that
the evil of lyncning was dying.

But it was not, as each

lynching committed causea a great outcry from the nation'
press.

The St. Louis Star felt that an answer must be

found before "the mob becomes a greater menace to America
than German militarism was to Europe."

2

with the liberal

voices of the nation pushing Congress closer to a "ederal
la.w or some other action against lyncning,
began to cover up their deeds.

the lynchers

'Tnough fewer lynchings

were reported in the press, they were at their peak of
cruelty.

Cold blooded murder was not enough; mobs needed

^Walter White, Congressional Digest, June-July, 1935
p. 192.

2,,Mob-Rule as a National Menace," Literary Digest, p
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sadistic revenge to calm their passion for blood.

White

investigated one of these sadistic events in 1918.

He

found evidence that many Blacks had been executed in
Lowndes and Brooks counties in Georgia.

The killings

ended with a pregnant Black woman being tied to a tree
and burned alive, after which she was split open and her
child still alive was thrown to the ground and stomped
to death by some of the brave members of the lynch mob.*
In both the North and the South mobs had returned to
the kind of barbarism common to pre-Christian Home, but
these men professed Christian virtues*

The small time

preachers, using their eloquence and a mastery of mob
psychology, swayed mobs to the belief that Blacks were
lower than dogs and must be kept down at all costs—
even if this meant using anti-Christian actions.
This is the atmosphere Walter White found when he
investigated lynchings for the NAACP.

His light skin

and a knowledge of Southern folkways, made it easy for
2
him to win the confidence of the local people.
Most of
the information that he handed over to state officials
was taken directly from participants in lynch mobs-though significantly enough, this information was never
used to convict any lynchers in any states.

His travels

^•Walter White, "The Work of a Mob," Crisis, September,
1918, p. 2 0 6 .
^Walter White, A Man Called White, p. 41.
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both North and South exposed lynchers for what they were-sexually tormented, perverted cowards.

Both White and

James Weldon Johnson, the NAACP Secretary during the
1920*s , felt Blacks were being misused by a combination of
white hysteria and local officials* unwillingness to
protect Blacks from this hysteria.

To correct the

problem they guided NAACP efforts to secure the passage
of a federal law to protect Blacks from their fellow
citizens.
The Dyer anti-lynch bill of 1922 was the first piece
of legislation passed by the House of Representatives
(231 for; 119 against) since reconstruction that specif
ically protected Blacks from lynching.
however, never became law.

The Dyer bill,

When it arrived in the Senate,

Southern Senators threatened a filibuster and it died in
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

The filibuster or

threat of a filibuster was the strongest weapon in the
Southern arsenal of tricks,

They argued, they talked and

they used every pari1amentary move to keep the bill from
being debated, muchless coming to a vote.

In his

autobiography, White blamed Senate rules for the bill's
death: "The archaic Senate rules which permit any Senator
to filibuster by speaking twice on any bill and on each
amendment thereto for as long as he wishes again stymied
our efforts," said White.1

The filibuster or its threat

Hfalter White, A Man Called White, p. 167.
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would kill all of the anti-lynching bills ever brought
before the Senate.

The threat of a filibuster kept the

Dyer bill in the Senate Committee on the Judiciary until
the 1922 session came to a close, thus automatically
killing the House-passed bill.
The NAACP attempted to force the Dyer bill's passage
by f3axing its political muscle but found it seriously
lacklijg.

It called attention to its cause by a series

of anti-lynching parades in New York and across the nation,
and it issued a statement saying that twelve persons had
been lynched in May and that five of these had been burned
at the stake.1

The NAACP®s thirteenth annual conference

issued a statement threatening all those Congressmen who
opposed the Dyer bill with an uphill fight in their next
try for election.

These tactics were of no consequence, for

the Dyer bill never reached the Senate floor.

Each new

Congress would find a new anti-lynch bill presented but the
NAACP was never able to muster enough political strength
to get one out of either the House or the Senate.
By the late 1920®s, White felt that the American
public was not interested in pressing a Federal anti-lynch
bill through Congress because there was no threat of an
outbreak of the infamy as there had been in the early
1920's.

The NAACP reported 18 lynchings for 1925 and 20

lwAnti-lynch Parade," New York Times, June
p. 22.
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1922

for 1926.1

After an extremely brutal lynching in Aiken,

South Carolina, in late 1926, White again began to urge the
2
passage of an anti-lynching bill.
White found not only Blacks but also whites being
ruled by mob terror, as most residents of Aiken were so
frightened they would not even talk about conditions,
and the state officials were powerless to do a n y t h i n g . ^
Only the federal government could correct the problem, but
the furor White raised in both Northern and Southern
newspapers was soon forgotten.

By 1928, there were

eleven lynchings— the lowest number since records began
some forty years before.2*

lynchers knew their work must

go underground, because decent Americans would have insisted
on an anti-lynch bill.

The small number of lynchings

lulled many well intentioned Americans into thinking the
South had finally become civilized.
White, however, continued his moral arguments for an
anti-lynch bill.

"Congress is apathetic about lynchings,"

he wrote in 192?, "but it is very much interested in base
ball scandals.

The race problem in this country has

^■"Lynching Report," New York Times, September 11,
1926, p. 2 3 .
^"Walter White," New York Times. January 3 , 1927, p. 3 .
^Walter White, "The Shambles of South Carolina,"
Crisis, December 1926, p. 321.
S h e NAACP 19th Annual Report of 1928. (New York:
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
Press, 1929) P* 22.
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resolved into the saving of the bodies of Blacks and
the souls of whites."1

Furthermore he argued that if

states could or would not protect all of their citizens
the federal government must step in and use its authority
and power to protect all citizens.
Southern Congressional reaction to any proposed antilynch bills was predictable.

One common argument was

that any anti-lynch bill would make for open season on
the honor of Southern womanhood.

They also argued that

lynching was the only law that Blacks understood.

They

felt that any form of anti-lynch bill passed would raise
the number of attacks on Southern womanhood to heights
never before recorded.

These statements and others were

calculated to appeal to any emotional fears they could
find in the rest of the nation.
White rebutted these Southern objections with
statistics proving less than 20% of the Blacks lynched had
committed the crime of rape, or any other crime of passion.
Blacks were lynched for crimes white businessmen wanted
to cover up, or even worse for no real reason.

It was no

crime of passion for a man to ask for the wages he had
earned, nor was it a crime of passion for him to walk
down a street and not jump into the gutter when a white
person approached.

Blacks were not asking special treatment

but only the same treatment that should have been awarded

lwWalter White," New York Times. January 3, 1927, p.3*
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to all United States citizens.

If the states could

not or would not provide justice it was the responsibility
of the federal government to step in and provide for the
protection of all citizens.
Southern Senators also attacked the constitutional
ity of the anti-lynch bills.

They concentrated on the

power that must be retained by the states and the danger
of putting too much authority in the hands of the federal
government.

They argued that anti-lynch bills would make

the Southern states administrative departments of the
Northern-dominated federal government.

States rights,

local control, and the American way of government would
be destroyed.

White countered the constitutional question

with another moral answer.

He felt the duty of the federal

government was to protect all citizens regardless of the
feelings of state and local officials.

He also felt that

the constitutional issue was just another smoke screen:
"A great many of those persons who bring up the constitu
tional issue," he wrote, "are primarily concerned with
masking motives for opposition to the legislation, which
are considerably less worthy than honest concern of danger
in the constitutionality of the anti-lynch bill,"-1- For
White it was better to be morally right and legally wrong
than to be legally right and morally wrong.

^Walter White, Congressional .Digest, June-July 1935,
p. 192.
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The stock market crash of 1929 and. the onset of
the depression caused an increase in lynchings.

Ten were

reported in 1930 with a peak of twenty-eight in 1933*
and then a steady decline to eight in 1936 and three in
1939.

After the crash of 1929» White felt the economic

crisis would allow the rope to again become the dominate
instrument of terror— keeping Blacks in an inferior
position and keeping them from the fruits of economic
recovery.

The increase in lynching led White to

strengthen his efforts to make lynching and mob violence
a violation of federal law.

He was convinced that

federal action would no longer allow white citizens the
freedom to attack Blacks without fear of punishment.
White*s quest for an anti-lynch law was supported by
many Northern Senators and Representatives.
several reasons for this support.

There were

Some congressmen felt

the time had come for justice with full and equal citizen
ship for the Black American, but along with this there
were political considerations.

Blacks in the North had

voted faithfully for the Republican Party ever since
Reconstruction— even though the Republican Party had cast
them aside in the 1920’s. By 193^. Black voting power had
shown it could be an effective political weapon.

Black

votes found the strength in 1930 to defeat the bid
of Judge John Parker for a seat on the Supreme Court.
President Hoover had nominated Parker to strengthen his
power in the South.

White expressed it this way: "The
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nomination was nothing more than a political sop to that
section and group which believes in nullifying the
political rights of United States citizens because of
their color."1

White and the NAACP also opposed Parker

because, "the utterance made by Judge Parker in a 1920
political speech, contravening the spirit and letter of
the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution, disqualified
him from sitting on the Supreme Court bench."2

White

thus directed the NAACP*s campaign to work for the defeat
of the nomination in the Senate by using the voter
pressure that they had acquired.

After the final vote

Judge Parker had lost by the narrow margin of

to 39*

This was a clear victory for White, the NAACP, and the
Black citizens of the United States.
White was not content with defeating Parker; he also
wanted to make an example of those Republican Senators
who had voted for confirmation.
ground.

He chose Ohio as his test

The state was predominantly Republican and it

looked impossible for anyone to defeat incumbent Roscoe
McCulloch, but a strong effort by White and the NAACP was
able to defeat McCulloch by the narrowest of margins.
The 1930 election served as a warning that Blacks would

lMNegroes Hail Senate Vote," New York Times. May 8 ,
1930. p. 4.
2ibid.
3walter White, A Man Called White, p. 110.
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no longer vote Republican just because it had. been the
party of Abraham Linclon.
Blacks made their final break for the Republican
Party in the election of 1932.

Blacks voted in large

numbers in Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio and Massachussets
for Franklin D. Roosevelt the Democratic candidate,
although many Blacks were aprehensive of John Garner,
Roosevelt's running mate from Texas, a state that was near
the head of the lynching list.

Congressmen from these and

other Northern states were now conscious of the Black vote
when they voted on legislation affecting Black citizenship
The Dyer bill of 1922, the Castigan-Wagner bill of
1935» the Gavagan bill of 1937* and the VanNuys bill of
19^0 all followed the same pattern.

The bills attacked

local and state officials who were negligent in the dis
charge of their responsibilities toward the citizens under
their jurisdiction.

Without protective laws, local

officials felt the need to look into the Black problem
only when a Black gained higher social status or higher
wages, or otherwise became an acceptable member of society
White could not be turned away from his goal of a
strong anti-lynch bill.

While the debate fumed over the

Gavagan bill of 1937. Southern senators tried a new
strategy.

Hatton Sumners of Texas proposed a weak

substitute bill through his fellow congressman, Arthur W.
Mitchell, a Black Democrat from Chicago.

White saw the

Mitchell bill as "so innocuous that we were convinced that
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it would do little if anything toward eradicating
lynchings or punishing l y n c h e r s . S u m n e r s remained
confident and told White the NAACP did not have nerve
enough to oppose an anti-lynch bill proposed by the only
2
Black congressman.
Sumners was wrong in his evaluation
of White's integrity.

White put pressure on anti-lynch

supporters and the Mitchell bill went down to defeat 157
to 122.

The Mitchell bill was defeated only because it

was not what White wanted.

In the fifteen years after

1922 the NAACP under the direction of White had gained
considerable political power and it was no longer afraid
to use it.
Congressman Mitchell had been at odds with the NAACP
ever since becoming a member of Congress and this weak
anti-lynch bill was just another in a long series of
disputes.^

in Mitchell's first speech before Congress he

had said that he would not work for any "race” issues and
he was the congressman of all the people, even though
elected by the Black community of Chicago.

Mitchell had

made so many anti-Black statements the NAACP felt they
could not depend on him in pushing for an effective antilynch bill.

^Walter White, A Man Called White, p. 172.
2ibid.
^Editorial, Crisis. June 1935. P« 177.
^Editorial, Crisis. February 1935. P* ^8 .
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The defeat of the Mitchell bill was only part of
the NAACP*s strength.

Immediately after the Mitchell

bill's defeat there was one of the most brutal lynchings
on record in Duck Hill, Mississippi.

This lynching

played on the conscience of many who were only half
hearted supporters of an anti-lynch bill and also it
played on the hearts and minds of the constitutents of
the congressmen who were not fully committed to the
Gavagan anti-lynch bill.

Because of the Mitchell Bill's

defeat, the Gavagan bill was finally brought to a vote
and was approved 277 to 119 by the House.
White's efforts in the anti-lynch fights of 1935 and
1938 were monumental.

So strong were they, in fact, that

the Southern filibuster lasted fourteen days in 1935 before
the Castigan-Wagner bill was taken out of consideration and
it took seven weeks and half a million dollars to defeat
the Gavagan anti-lynch bill.
had come to be recognized.

White's congressional power
James P. Byrnes of South

Carolina stood in the Senate and said, "One Negro. . .
has ordered this bill to pass and if a majority can pass
it, it will pass.

If Walter White should consent to

have this bill laid aside, its advocates would desert it
as quickly as football players unscramble when the whistle
1

of the referee is h e a r d . W h i t e ' s word was the only
thing that kept the bill before Congress.

Congressmen in

lwNational Affairs," Time, January 2k, 1938, p. 9.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Northern states with large Black populations could not
maintain secure positions with the threat of a Black vote
against them in future elections.

The Senate filibuster

against the Gavagan bill continued until the pressure of
starving millions in need of food and money was used as
an excuse to get it set aside.
The VanNuys anti-lynch bill of 19^0 was the last to
pass the House, but it never received the attention the
previous bills had.

The war in Europe and Asia had averted

the attention of public opinion.

Even the Crisis stopped

talking about lynching and ran headlines like “When do we
Ply?" and "Jim Crow in the Army Camps."1

Blacks still

wanted to be accorded full citizenship and the honor of
fighting the Nazis to keep Hitler's racial attitudes away
from the few freedoms they had already won.
White's activity in supporting anti-lynch bills was
indicative of his whole career as NAACP Secretary.

He

did not call for mass action, nor did he shout political
slogans, and he definitely did not threaten the opponents
of anti-lynch bills.
without fanfare.

He went about his work quietly and

He worked with men who had the power

to accomplish his ends.

His personal approach to these

men in power was effective.

He managed to put Blacks in

a position they had never held in American society.

He

would be criticized by later Black militants for his lack

^■Cover, Crisis, December 19^0.
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of achievement, but White’s work was to make the NAACP
an organization that could put pressure on officials and
be sure that there would be a fair hearing.

White, like

the NAACP itself, was a product of the early 20th century
and not of the mid-20th century.

If either had called

for mass demonstrations and disruptions, the place Blacks
occupy today would assuredly be similar to the position
of Blacks in South Africa.
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IV

WALTER WRITE AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Writing today it seems incredible that there was a
time when people were offended by not being allowed to
participate in war, but in 19^0 Black Americans were upset
because they were not going to be allowed to fight in the
forthcoming war.

After their experience in World War One,

they felt the time had come at last for them to be 100^
Americans.

The Army, however, made no provision for Black

troops, and World War One policies of exclusion and
segregation were continued.

Army policy makers felt that

Blacks were supposedly incapable of holding up under combat
conditions and lacked the mental qualities to make good
soldiers; thus they would only impair the war effort if
they were given an equal opportunity to participate.

Walter

White and the NAACP struggled throughout the war to give
Black men equal responsibility and participation in the
war effort.
During the F< .st World War, Black troops in Europe
had faced humiliating problems.

They were either attached

to French units or placed into segregated labor units.
They were not allowed to speak with the French— especially
the women.

They were given fewer leave privileges, and

they faced harsh discipline--all because they were Black.
In spite of these handicaps Black troops have an impressive
35
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First World War record.1
Army policies at the beginning of World War Two were
bf»,:cd on what was thought to be the lessons of the First
World War and Black troops again were used exclusively In
segregated labor batallions.

The few Black troops who

had seen combat In the First World War had been attached
to the French Army; thus white commanders had no knowledge
of the use or the capacity of Black troops.

If the situation

of the Black enlisted man was bad, the Black officer fared
even worse.

First World War Blacks were seldom allowed to

become officers, and when they did they were treated as
though they were still second-class citizens and not
officers in the United States Army.

Thus it was difficult

for Black officers to command respect from Black troops,
and they were not allowed any authority in the discipline
or conduct of white troops.

Black officers were used

exclusively to make an impression on the Black press and
on Black leaders, so they would not stir up Black resistance
to the war effort.

These officers were carefully chosen

so none of them would rebel against army authority and
treatment.

White reflected in his autobiography why

he was not chosen for officer candidate school— his skin
2
was too light.
A war rumor had made the rounds that the

^•John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom. (New York:
Alfred Knopf, 1956) pp. 447-4-62.
2Walter White, A Man Called White, p. 36 .
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Kaiser planned to subvert the American army by using
light-skinned Blacks who would then rise up and massacre
white people in their beds; thus “light skinned Negroes
who could easily pass as white" could not be trusted
and Walter White was by passed even though he had the
talent, education, and desire to become an army officer.1
Between 1919 and 1940 the War Department's policies
had remained the same.

Blacks were excluded from officer

ranks in the regular army, although some were admitted to
reserve and national guard units.

Thus in 1939 there were

only three Black officers in the regular army and 1,640
2
enlisted men.
Navy policies were even more stringent.
Blacks were not allowed to rise above the rank of messboy
and the Marine Corps did not accept any Blacks.
With the approach of the 1940 Presidential election
Blacks again put pressure on the government for a change
in policy.

The election was crucial to Franklin Roosevelt.

He was going against the two-term tradition and to win he
was advised to court the Black vote.
however, did not acquiesce.

3

Black leaders,

White told both the Democrats

and the President that "any candidate for President meriting
the colored support must stand first for the elimination

1lbid.

p

Richard M, Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed
Forces. (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press,
1969) P. 41.
^Walter White, A Man Called White, p. 186,
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of the color line from the armed s e r v i c e s . T h e War
Department, however, continued to resist any type of
change.

In September, 19^0, White, A. Phillip Randolph,

and T. Arnold Hill met with President Roosevelt to discuss
the possibility of an end to the War Department’s policies
of exclusion.

White as spokesman told the President of

the low morale among Blacks because of exclusion and
expressed the hope that the President would consider the
use of Black troops as both officers and enl.

j.

men in

all branches of the armed forces without regard to race
2
or color.
After about an hour of discussion the inter
view ended.

White and the others left with the impression

that Mr. Roosevelt would look into the situation and make
needed changes in policy and report to them at a future
date.
In early October the three Black leaders were shocked
to read a release by President Roosevelt’s press secretary
Stephen Early stating that War Department policies were
not to be changed: Blacks would serve only In segregated
units, they would have only manual labor Jobs, and they
would be excluded from the marines.3

The Black press

accused White of selling out to the government.

White

and the others reacted quickly to the charges and issued

^Richard Dalflume, Desegregation, p. 31•
2ibid. p. 37
3lbld. p. 38-3 9 .
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a copy of the presentation made to the President showing
that they had demanded

an end to the War Department’s

segregation policies.

White and other Black leaders

also added that

;hey could not support the President in

his bid for reelection

unless he changed his mind.

White had gone so

far as to write a letter to

President Roosevelt complaining that his position as a
Black leader had been "seriously impaired."^

Roosevelt

was forced to decide whether to soothe hurt Black feelings
or lose the Black vote to Wendle Willkie, who was making
a strong bid for Black support by calling for an end to
2
segregation in the armed forces.
Roosevelt decided to
soothe feelings.

In a political move the week before the

election, Benjamin 0, Davis was promoted, making him the
first Black general in United States History, William Hastie
was appointed as Assistant Secretary of War, and Campbell
Johnson was made advisor to the Director of Selective Service.3
Roosevelt's work was not in vain.

White wrote

Roosevelt on the eve of the election, "We have worked
night and day during recent weeks to take personally to
the people the things you did and wrote,

and

I am

certain tomorrow will reveal that Negroes know the

^Richard Dalfiume, Desegregation, p. 41.
^ lbld. pp. 33-36. and Walter White, A Man Called White,
p. 188.
3ibid.
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*0
truth.White

felt the President had done an acceptable

job of trying to end segregation in the armed forces.
Other Blacks were not as pleased as White with Roosevelt's
action.

The Baltimore Afro-American, which had long

been at odds with White and the NAACP, wrote in an editorial,
"We asked Mr. Roosevelt to cnange the rules of the game
and he counters by giving us some new uniforms."2

The

Afro-Amerlcan felt Roosevelt had again duped Black
Americans.
The NAACP's attack on the War Department's policy
of segregation, however, was a new trend in the organi
zation's thinking.

During the 1930's the NAACP had concerned

Itself with attempting to correct violent infringements
on Black citizens civil rights and particularly it had
worked for a Federal anti-lynching bill.

Now it was

concerned with the social impact of segregation as a way
of keeping Blacks in their "place."

Civil rights were

worthless without equality and equality was not possible
in a segregated society.

World War One had taught Blacks

that the patterns of segregation praticed by white Americans
if left to continue would destroy the Black race in
America, or would soon return it to a position similar
to the Africans in the Union of South Africa.

Segregation

^-Richard Dalfiume, Desegregation, p.
2lbld.
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if left to continue eculd only destroy.*
The outbreak of war in 19^1 and the subsequent call
for draftees and volunteers brought the problem to a
head.
war.

Blacks were asking for a share in prosecuting the
Many whites too wanted more Blacks to serve, as War

Department policies of exclusion meant that more whites
2
would have to be drafted.
Finally what was to be done
with the Blacks who were entering the army— many special
new segregated facilities had to be built and maintained.
In December of 19^1 White tried to break War
Department segregation policies from another angle.

He

proposed the army form an integrated division composed
of volunteers.

After activation, the division "would

serve as a tremendous lift to the morale of the Negro.

. .

and would also have tremendous psychological effect upon
white Americans, and it would give the lie to the attacks
made by Nazi Germany.

. .to the effect that the United

States talks about democracy but practices racial segregation
and discrimination."3

From the War Department came the

expected reply: "four comments have been made a matter of
official record for such reference as circumstances may
w a r r a n t . T h e r e was no support in the War Department and

H a r o l d Cruse, The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual.
(New York: William Morrow and Co. 1967) PP» 208-209*
2
Bichard Dalfiume, Desegregation, p. 36.
3ibld. p. 48.
^Walter White, A Man Called White, p. 222.
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none from anyone else who could rectify the situation,
even though many young men— both Black and white— were
willing to Join such a unit if it were ever activated.

i

By insisting on a policy of segregation the War
Department was working against itself.

Graduates of

segregated Southern Black schools with inferior educations
were failing the Army General Classification Test (AGCT).
To some this was proof that whites were superior, and
thus Blacks should be excluded from the armed forces. But
even the Blacks who scored higher than poorly educated
Southern whites became laborers while the whites became
technicians.

But because AGCT standards were found to

be too rigid— many men would have been exempt— and they had
to be relaxed to allow men with lower qualifications the
2
priviledge of joing and Blacks were in this catagory.
Even with this relaxation of the mental standards many
Blacks had been passed over in favor of whites because there
were too few all Black divisions for the influx of Black
volunteers, and the army was reluctant to authorize any
new all Black divisions.^
To make use of the Black draftees and volunteers,
the War Department made special plans in February of 1942
to place them into labor divisions.

The army had committed

1Walter White, A Man Called White, p. 222.
^Richard Dalflume, Desegregation, p. 57*
^ibld. p. 48-49.
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itself to a quota of 10$ Black strength for the war.1
The War Department went out of its way to make work for
the men and to give their divisions high sounding titles
like "port battalions," "water supply battalions,"
"gasoline supply battalions," "ammunition battalions,"
"station maintenance companies," and "metropolitan service
companies."

These units were to do all of the dirty hard

jobs the army had; there was even talk about some Black
units being used to pick cotton.^

These units also were

designed to keep the Black soldier in his "place."

This

situation broke down the morale of Black people both in
and out of the military.

Black soldiers worked reluctantly

because they were not allowed an active and equal part
in the war effort.

Black civilians were not excited about

supporting the war because there were many war related
industries that still would not allow them the oppor
t u n i t y to work, though there was a shortage of men to
fill the jobs that were available.

2i

White went to Europe and Africa in 1 9 ^ as War
correspondent for the New York Post.

His findings after

interviews with great numbers of Black troops and white

^•Richard Dalfiume, Desegregation, p. 36.
2ibld, p. 59.
^Adam Clayton Powell Jr., Marching Blacks, (New York:
Dial Press, 19^-5) p. 13^«
^Walter White, A Man Called White, pp. 22*4-225.
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officers were published in a book entitled A Rising
Wind, which was a social and military history of Black
Americans during the Second World War.

Upon arriving in

England he found the military surprisingly cooperative.
But he also found War Department policies being followed
to the letter, with all Black soldiers in segregated
labor units.

Black soldiers laboring in segregated units

also caused America's peculiar racial attitudes to be
transferred to Europe.1
they must be Inferior.

If Blacks did only manual labor
Service organizations were

segregated— at great expense; towns were put off limits
to Blacks and others put off limits to whites;

white

soldiers told fantastic tales of Blacks being devils with
tails;^ and finally military discipline was used to
break down Blacks who dared to speak out against i n j u s t i c e . ^
To his surprise White found that Englishmen did not
h.
believe these tales, and in fact some pubs were made off
limits— voluntarily by the owners— to white American soldiers,
for the exclusive use of Black soldiers and Englishmen.^

W a l t e r White, A Rising Win d , (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday, Doran and Co., 194-5) p. 17.
2
ibid. p. 16.
3jbld, p. 24.
p. 245.

also Walter White, A Man Called White,

^Walter White, A Rising W ind, pp. 27-29, and 56-57*
^lbid. p. 11.
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Englishmen were pleased by the behavior of Black soldiers
and were astonished at the actions of white soldiers and
commanders in their personal and professional relations
with the Black soldier.1
Placing Black soldiers in labor battalions was
depressing, but even worse was the policy of placing white
officers in charge, especially when the officers were
too insensitive or too prejudiced to care for the feelings
or morale of the Black soldier.

Without exception, Black

soldiers told White of the uneven administration of Justice.
For the same offence committed by a white soldier or even
a lesser offence Black soldiers received the maximum
punishment.

One of the many examples White cited in A

Rising Wind concerned a Black soldier who was given six
months in the stockade for missing bed check, plus an
additional twelve months for calling the court prejudiced,
while a white soldier was given only three months for
beating up his superior officer and calling him every name
in the book.^
In addition to the tension caused by prejudiced white
officers, segregation caused many other emotional problems
for Blacks.

Many studies of the efficiency of American

soldiers after the war found that men placed in a segregated

■^Walter White, A Rising Wind, p. 22-23.
2ibld. p. 2*4— 25.
White, pp. 2*44-2*4-5.

also Walter White, A Man Called
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unit are already made to !>'*] inferior and not a part
or the real army,1

Everything that happens Is blamed on
2
racial prejudice and not on the army system.
White was

convinced the only way to make Blacks feel that they were
finally American citizens was to make them an integral
part of the army.
The War Department did not alter its policies of
segregation until December, 1944, when the Germans began
a counter attack popularly known as the Battle of the Bulge.
This battle forced the need for more troops in a hurry
and the only available ones were Blacks in labor battalions
stationed in England.

These Black troops sent volunteers

who were integrated into white divisions on a platoon
basis— one Black platoon to each white company.

Total

Integration was thus still ignored by the War Department.3
This token integration was, however, quite successful.
For the first time Blacks were able to show what they were
capable of and they preformed in an exceptional manner.
But as soon as the danger was past, and the Americans
were again driving the Germans back, there was no longer
a need for the extra man power, and the Black troops were
returned to their segregated labor battalions.

1David G. Mandelbaum, Soldier Groups and Negro Soldiers.
(Berkley, California: University of California P r e s s , 1952;
P. 952 ibid.

^Walter White, A Man Called White, P. 230.
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In 1944, as in 1940, the Black vote loomed decisive
in the Presidential election.

White estimated that at

least 17 states with a total of 281 electoral votes were
balanced by the power of the Black vote.

Black leaders

knew that they had the power to make demands and to control
the vote for the party that responded.

In a June meeting

White and a number of other Black leaders drafted an
open statement to the two political parties to see what
the response would be:
No injustice embitters Negroes more
than continued segregation and discrimination
in the armed forces. The national policy of
segregating Negroes in the armed forces violates
every principle of democracy. Any party or
candidate that hopes to win the support and
respect of Negroes and all progressive groups
must prove their belief in democracy by
adopting a democratic program for the integration
of all Americans into unsegregated military forces.

. .

Neither party was responsive to this plank in the
Black platform, but the Democrats had proved themselves to
be more responsive to other Black needs; thus, as in 1940,
the Black vote again went to Franklin Roosevelt,
The war ended with only some small gains for Blacks
in the armed forces.

They were now promoted in both the

Navy and Marines, and in some units the punishment was
on an equal basis, but a lot still needed to be done.

^Walter White, A Man Called White, p. 262.
2ibid. p. 264.
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V

CONCLUSION

The three challenges faced by Walter White and the
NAACP in this paper illustrate only a part of his life.
He was constantly working for Black equality even though
he could have easily passed over into the white community.
His was the conviction that one day there would be an
America where the Black man would be looked upon as an
equal citizen.

In all of these cases, White worked quietly

and in the background; he was not the type of man who
sought the spotlight.

Although he was an intellectual,

the readers of his books cannot miss the impact and
intensity of his work.
When we look at White we must avoid placing his life
in the context of the I960*s.

Seen from today’s perspective,

he seems cautious and satisfied with minor gains; in fact,
he would be called an "uncle tom" in today’s vernacular.
This is not the case.

An "uncle tom" always proves ready

to give in; White, however, never compromised his ideals.
His approach was noninflamatory but nevertheless directed
toward achievable goals.

If we take the example of two

radical white groups of his time, the Industrial Workers
of the World and the Communist Party of the United States,
we see that they were literally destroyed by the majority
of the people who felt a threat to their American dream.
White had to work quietly while making a political base
from which-to launch his attacks on prejudice and dis-
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crimination.
He was not able to work effectively in Congress until
after 1930* when along with Black support through the NAACP,
he was able to defeat the Senators who had supported Judge
John Parker.

Once established, this political base gave

Blacks a bargaining point from which to work.

White also

was a master strategist; he was able to conceed a few
battles to win the overall war for Black equality.
Because of White's long tenure as head of the NAACP,
that organization is even today staffed in- the top
positions by men who were under the direct influence of
White's philosophy.

They saw patience and hard work paying

off and they were willing to remain patient until their
work was done.

But to say the patience of White implied

a lack of courage is a totally false assumption.

In

everything that he worked for there was determination and
courage of the first degree.

In his investigation of

lynchings in the South, he was close to being lynched
himself but was able to escape just before they found his
true identity.

From these early investigations came the

many first-hand articles he wrote for Northern newspapers
and magazines.

In White's work for an anti-lynch bill

there were numerous occasions where White stood up to
the top congressional leaders and told exactly what he
wanted for the Blacks of America.

To even stand up to

top officials was somewhat of a new role for a Black man
to play as the twenties and thirties were times when the
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Black man was treated as less than dirt in many parts of
the country.

This example of White should show the present

leaders of the NAACP, the Congress and the many cities
across the United States that for Blacks the American
dream— whatever it may be for millions of others— must
be something that can be realized.
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